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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
posed serious financial burdens on any future traffic improvement
projects.
As on previous occasions the Supreme Court refused to take
into consideration "mere possibilities" in fixing the market value
of expropriated land. 0 In Plaquemines Parish School Board v.
Miller,1 a case in which the issue was a "matter solely of the
value of the lands" it was stated again that "it will not do for
the owner to say that at some indefinite time it is foreseeable
that his property, because it adjoins a growing town, will have an
added value as a subdivision project. '62
SALES
J. Denson Smith*
The cases falling under this heading that were decided by
the court during the last term included a few of more than
passing jurisprudential interest. High on this list was a group
of fifteen suits consolidated for trial, Breaux v. Laird.' The
court reversed the judgment of the trial court sustaining an
exception of no right or cause of action and held that the pur-
chaser of a defective home from a subdivision developer was
entitled to sue the surety on the contractor's bond. The decision
was bottomed on Article 2011 of the Civil Code. This article
provides for the transmission of rights resulting from a contract
relative to immovable property in favor of the transferee of
the property. No exactly similar application of this article has
60. See Louisiana Highway Commission v. Guidry, 176 La, 389, 403, 146
So. 1, 5 (1933); Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Sarpy, 125 La. 388, 51 So. 433
(1910).
61. 222 La. 584, 63 So. 2d 6 (1953).
62. 222 La. 584, 589, 63 So. 2d 6, 8 (1953). See also Louisiana Highway
Commission v. Guidry, 176 La. 389, 146 So. 1 (1933). The instant case shows
just as the American Tel. & Tel. Co. case a paucity of evidence relating to
the value of land, as pointed out by Justice LeBlanc. In Texas Pipe Line Co.
v. Johnson, 223 La. 380, 65 So. 2d 884, 886 (1953), Justice Hamiter correctly
refused a motion by defendant-appellant to remand the cause for the recep-
tion of additional evidence, and cited language from Kinnebrew v. Louisiana
Ice Co., 216 La. 472, 501, 43 So. 2d 798, 808 (1949), that our Supreme Court is
"not disposed to permit litigants to try their cases piecemeal and continue
protracted litigation as to facts that could have been established on the
original trial," just as he had done once before in Young v. Mulroy, 216 La.
961, 971, 45 So. 2d 357, 360 (1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 223 La. 446-465, 65 So. 2d 907-913 (1953).
[VOL. XIV
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
been found.2 It was not taken from the Code Napol6on but
seems to have been based on the writings of Toullier.3 He as-
serted that the right of an owner against a builder who contracts
to erect a structure on the former's property passes tacitly to
the transferee of the property as an accessory. Support for this
proposition was found by Toullier in the Roman law and in other
provisions of the Code Civil, particularly Article 1122 which
provides, in effect, that one is considered as having stipulated
for himself and for his heirs and assigns unless the contrary
is expressed or results from the nature of the agreement. The
result may be considered as a tacit assignment. Assuming a
bilateral contract between former owner and contractor for the
services to be performed, obligating the owner to pay for them,
one may wonder whether the tacit assignment of the right car-
ries with it a tacit assumption of the duty? Toullier did not go
into this. He did recognize, as does our code,4 that a real obli-
gation leaves the acquirer free to surrender the property and
does not become a personal obligation "unless he has made it
such by his own act." Perhaps claiming the benefits of the con-
tract might be interpreted as such an act. Further development
of this aspect of the principle of Article 2011, and related provi-
sions, will come in time. It may be observed in passing that
the right of the acquirer is not a real right. It is simply a per-
sonal right against the contractor. Nor is the obligation of the
contractor a real obligation. It, again, is personal. Of course,
the right of the owner is heritable, and is also assignable.
Article 2011 provides a tacit assignment in favor of a transferee
under particular title. The instant decision is consistent with
the source of its authority.
An interesting and important question concerning the re-
covery of damages for breach of a contract to purchase 500 tons
of steel caused a division of the court in Friedman Iron & Supply
Co. v. J. B. Beaird Co.5 At the time defendant repudiated
the contract and throughout the delivery period the market
price was below the contract price; but at the time of the trial,
more than a year later, the market price was above the contract
price. The suit was originally filed as one for specific perfor-
2. But see Simoneaux v. Lebermuth & Israel Planting Co., 155 La. 689,
99 So. 531 (1924); Canal & Carrollton Railway Co. v. Orleans Railway Co.,
44 La. Ann. 54, 10 So. 389 (1892).
3. 3 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangals nos 421-424 (1833).
4. Art. 2019, La. Civil Code of 1870.
5. 222 La. 627, 63 So. 2d 144 (1952).
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mance or damages in the alternative. Plaintiff alleged in its
petition that it had segregated and stockpiled the steel for de-
fendant and it was awaiting shipment but that tender and
delivery had been refused. The demand for specific performance
was dismissed on an exception of no cause of action and was
abandoned by the plaintiff. The court's original holding was
that inasmuch as the plaintiff still held the steel, the market
value of which, at the time of the trial, was above the contract
price, plaintiff had failed to prove that the breach had resulted
in any loss. On rehearing the original decree was reversed
and set aside, and judgment rendered for the difference between
the contract and market prices at the time delivery was refused.
Justices Hamiter and Hawthorne dissented.
The court applied the usual rule that in the event of a
breach by a buyer the seller is entitled to recover the differ-
ence between the market price and the contract price at the
time of the breach. The court considered the date plaintiff
received the cancellation notice as the time of the breach.
Actually the cancellation notice constituted an anticipatory re-
pudiation since it was received before any delivery was due.
Deliveries were to be made on certain specified dates during
the next three months. The accepted rule elsewhere would
measure the recovery as of the time and place of delivery not-
withstanding an anticipatory repudiation. But there was appar-
ently no showing of market prices on the delivery dates. Pre-
termitting this angle, since it appears that a seller cannot re-
cover for a loss resulting from a decline in the market price
subsequent to the time for performance, that is, since, if he
holds the goods and the price goes down the resulting loss is
not chargeable to the buyer, it also seems logical to conclude
that if he holds the goods and the price goes up the resulting
profit should not inure to the benefit of the buyer. A detailed
consideration of this problem will appear in the next issue of
this RE iEw.
The significant case of LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co.6 has been examined at length in this REVIEW.7 Believ-
ing that the warranty there found was considered by the court
as contractual in nature, the writer shares the doubt voiced in
the casenote concerning the legal propriety of extending a direct
6. 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952).
7. Note, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 624 (1953).
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warranty of wholesomeness by a manufacturer of a bottled
beverage to a non-purchasing consumer. Such an objection would
fall, of course, if the warranty was recognized as being merely
a warranty imposed by law as a matter of public policy irre-
spective of agreement.
Buyers should get a degree of comfort from the court's
realistic disposition of a redhibitory action aimed at the res-
cission of a sale of a new automobile by defendant to plaintiff.8
It affirmed that a purchaser of an automobile is entitled to get
a vehicle that will meet his needs and recognized that one that
will not run or runs intermittently or imperfectly and that re-
quires the frequent attention of a mechanic to keep it going
is an abomination to the owner that the law does not require
him to endure. The decision makes it clear also that the pur-
chaser may continue using the car, while the seller is engaged
in trying to remedy the defects. A period of nine months dur-
ing which the car had been driven 9600 miles was here involved.
But all of this time the seller was continuously assuring the
owner that the defects would be remedied. Although a pur-
chaser may well foresee that adjustments may have to be made
before the new car he buys may operate properly and should
be required to submit to them, the risk of serious maladjustments
that cannot be or are not readily corrected should not be placed
on him. As the court said previously, "An automobile vendee
does not contract to hire an expert automobile mechanic to
drive him."9
The case of J. E. Beaird Co. v. Burris Bros.10 came back to
the court following a prior remand to determine the amount
defendant was entitled to by way of a reduction in the purchase
price of a sweet potato dehydrator."' In the prior opinion there
was evidence of a claimed guarantee of capacity. The court
seemed to feel that the guarantee had been proved but appar-
ently felt that any such finding was unnecessary. Relying on
the articles of the code dealing with redhibition, it was decided
that the defendant was entitled to a reduction in the purchase
price. The case was remanded for a determination of the
amount to be allowed. The lower court seemingly based its
award on alleged losses incurred by the defendant in its opera-
8. Reech v. Coco, 223 La. 346, 65 So. 2d 790 (1953).
9. Jackson v. Breard Motor Co., 167 La. 857, 120 So. 478 (1929).
10. 222 La. 579, 63 So. 2d 4 (1953).
11. See prior opinion in 216 La. 655, 44 So. 2d 693 (1950).
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tion of the machine over a period of some two or three years.
On the instant appeal the court denied that losses sustained
through the operation of the machine offered a criterion for
determining the reduction. Yet it allowed defendant some $600
more than the difference between what he paid for the machine
and the price obtained by him on its resale. The underlying
theory does not appear in the opinion. Presumably damages
were being allowed for breach of contract, that is, breach of
the claimed guarantee. The opinion speaks of a guarantee yet
purports to allow only a reduction in the purchase price as pro-
vided in the prior remand. Surely a reduction in the purchase
price alone could not exceed the difference between what the
buyer paid for the machine and what he got for it on resale. And
for redhibitory defects, unaccompanied by knowledge thereof
and neglect to declare them, damages are not recoverable. Per-
haps the theory of presumptive knowledge was being applied
but this seems doubtful. At any rate, the buyer came off pretty
well. He used the machine, such as it was, for three years. He
then recovered in full everything it cost him, plus something over
$600. Justice Hamiter dissented.
The one year prescriptive period for instituting the red-
hibitory action runs from the discovery of the vice when the
seller knows of the vice and neglects to declare it. Such knowl-
edge is imputed to the artisan, craftsman, builder or manufac-
turer. The court refused to apply this rule against the vendor
of a building and dismissed the suit against him in Sterbcow
v. Peres.12 It found that the actual construction was by an
independent contractor. Nor did the court believe the evidence
disclosed actual knowledge.
In Bayou Rapides Lumber Co. v. Davies the court followed
an earlier case holding that in an action of redhibition a reduc-
tion in the purchase price may be decreed even if rescission
may not be granted because the thing sold has been disposed
of by the purchaser. The thing sold was a house and its insuffi-
cient foundations were held not discoverable on simple inspec-
tion by an ordinary layman.
In Bishop v. Copeland4 the court affirmed the established
rule that the law of registry is not applicable to a claim vested
12. 222 La. 850, 64 So. 2d 195 (1953).
13. 221 La. 1099, 61 So. 2d 885 (1952).
14. 222 La. 284, 62 So. 24 486 (1953).
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by operation of law, such as that of heirs to an inheritance from
their half-sister. It also refused to find the heirs estopped to
assert their ownership on the ground that they had permitted
their father to be sent into possession of the whole. They had
neither aided nor assisted in bringing about the error by an
affirmative act or omission under circumstances prompting ac-
tion. It was also held that the purchaser, who succeeded to a
one-fourth interest in the land, was not entitled to a judgment
in warranty until after a partition and accounting had made
his damage determinable. The decision finds ample support in
the law and the facts.
A sale by a deceased father to one of three daughters was
sustained in Taylor v. Brown15 against the claim by the other
two that the transfer was in reality a donation in disguise in
that the price paid was less than one-fourth the value of the
property. The court found the stated price legally adequate
and avoided passing on the trial court's action in admitting
parol evidence by the defendant to show additional consideration
in the form of services rendered. In passing, it observed that the
question of the admissibility of parol evidence "tending to en-
large the recitals of an authentic act is not free from doubt."
This is certainly true of Louisiana jurisprudence although the
rule in France seems to be very well understood as prohibiting
any oral evidence against or beyond any written instrument.
The rule stemmed from the belief that a writing is a more
reliable form of proof than oral testimony. With respect to the
cause of a contract this rule prohibits the use of parol evidence
to show the true cause unless the stated cause is disproved by
legally admissible evidence. 16
In Fisher v. Bullington 7 the court protected an Illinois con-
ditional vendor of an automobile who consented to its removal
to Arkansas but not to Louisiana where it was resold and bought
by the defendant. The decision accords with the principle of
prior cases denying validity to out-of-state conditional sales only
where the property is removed to Louisiana with the seller's
knowledge and consent.
A conflict of testimony was resolved against a buyer of hotel
furnishings and a recovery of damages to cover expenses in-
15. 66 So. 2d 578 (La. 1953).
16. See, generally, Rubin, Parol Evidence to Vary a Recital of Con-
sideration, 3 LOUisiANA LAW REviEw 427 (1941).
17. 223 La. 368, 65 So. 2d 880 (1953).
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curred in having to disinfect upholstered furniture and bedding
was rejected in Villegas v. Latter.:8
On its third presentation to the court, the litigation of
Cerami v. Haas,' involving a contract to sell real estate, was
dismissed as res adjudicata under Louisiana Civil Code Article
2286.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
MATERIALMAN'S LIEN (UNDER BUILDING CONTRACT LAW)
In appropriate cases, the statutory delay within which a
claim must be filed, in order to establish a laborer's or material-
man's lien on the property, is sixty days after the last delivery
of all material or the last performance of all labor on the
property. This has been interpreted to mean sixty days after
the completion of the structure regardless of the last date of
services or deliveries by the particular claimant.' Since there
is no room for ambiguity in the counting of the days, the issue
on which disputes center is the starting point for the running
of this time. Generally, a building is considered as completed
when it is ready for actual occupancy, even though minor re-
pairs and adjustments have to be made at a later date.2 In the
case of Trouard v. Calcasieu Building Materials, Inc.,3 the sup-
plier of materials filed his claim about seven months after the
end of construction and actual occupancy of the building. How-
ever, he contended that the house was not finished because
certain things required for either F.H.A. or V.A. approval had
not yet been done. The only issue was whether the claim had
been timely filed, and the court held that it had not, stating
that the stipulations of a lending agency for requirements which
were not part of the building specifications did not constitute
any criterion in determining whether or not a building is a
completed structure within the meaning of the building con-
tract statute.
18. 66 So. 2d 339 (La. 1953).
19. 222 La. 899, 64 So. 2d 212 (1953).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. National Homestead Ass'n v. Graham, 176 La. 1062, 147 So. 348 (1933).
2. Hortman-Salmen Co. v. White, 168 La. 1067, 123 So. 715 (1929).
3. 222 La. 1, 62 So. 2d 81 (1952).
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